

Measurable Safety -Standards and Regulatory implications – A perspective SIP-adus 2020

Gil Amid Foretellix Ltd

The regulatory and liability prospective: Safe?

No Standards In Place




What to demand for certification? What can be tested ? What data can be used ? What is "safe enough" ? What is the required minimum ?







Building the AV Safety Argument


- Verification & validation metrics are needed for enabling the body of evidence required for building the AV's safety case
- Coverage Metrics measure what actually happens and provides scenario coverage aggregation analytics & metrics
- Coverage metrics supports all existing and emerging safety standards & processes







ASAM Example Workflow for Scenario-Based Testing (SBT



A Pragmatic Example:

Applying CDV to Verify Regulatory Compliance -ALKS regulation.


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ALKS -	Appendix 3		e lateral	and	
longituc	Guidance on Traffic disturbance critical scenarios for ALKS		ut furthe	ut further	
driver c	1.	General			
This UN	1.	This document clarifies derivation process to define conditions under which Automated Lane Keeping Systems (ALKS) shall avoid a collision. Conditions under which ALKS shall avoid a collision are determined by a general circulation process with following attentions human divisor performance model	milesto traffic Published: Some 60 c	ulation on Automated Lane Keeping Systems is ne for safe introduction of automated vehicles 5 June 2020 outrits have mathed a milestone in the adottom of a United Nations	
– Appro		simulation program with following attentive human driver performance model and ¹ related parameters in the traffic critical disturbance scenarios.	Regulation t automated v The UN Reg	sat will allow fur the safe introduction of environments.	
	2.	Traffic critical scenarios	cars which, o vehicle. How and can be	and nearing system near activitied, are a very, the chiver car requested by the spectral of vehicle requested by the spect	
ALKS's C	2.1.	Traffic disturbance critical scenarios are those which have conditions under which ALKS may not be able to avoid a collision.	binding inte therefore m	terday by UNECES - hyperies - hyp	
 Roads 	2.2.	Following three are traffic critical scenarios:		Even Links (Links and August	
	 (a) Cut-in: the 'other vehicle' suddenly merg vehicle' 	 Cut-in: the 'other vehicle' suddenly merges in front of the 'ego vehicle' 		16 Section of the section of the section of regions 1. Continuent of production 17. Nonline this control of production 18. Nonline this is an eliterized to accumulate 18. Nonline this section of the factor them are marked to a solution production 19. Nonline this section of the factor them are marked to a solution production	
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– The or		(c) Deceleration: the 'other vehicle' suddenly decelerates in front of the 'ego vehicle'		1 Ster (periodiante de 2020) * Page namer et () konjinitér es ber nage	
	2.3.	Each of these traffic critical scenarios can be created using the following parameters/elements:		UNEC	



ALKS Scenarios






Cut Out - Terminology and Notations

Initial Velocity Ve0 = Ego vehicle

Vo0 = Leading vehicle in lane or in adjacent lane **Vf0** = Vehicle in front of leading vehicle in lane

Initial Distance dx0 = Distance in Longitudinal direction between the front end of the ego vehicle and the rear end of the leading vehicle **dx0_f** = Distance in longitudinal direction between front end of leading vehicle and rear end of vehicle in front of leading © 2020 Foretehicle




M-SDL Cut Out Scenario Implementation

do serial():

```
dut_speed_up: parallel( duration: [6..10]second):
    dut.car.drive(path: path) with:
        ego_mode(alk)
        other_car.drive(path: path, adjust: false)
        in_front_car.drive(path:path)
```


```
lead: parallel(duration: [1..3]second):
    dut.car.drive(path: path) with:
        ego_mode(alk)
    other_car.drive(path: path, adjust: false) with:
        lane(same_as: dut.car)
        position(time: [THW..THW], ahead_of: dut.car, at:end)
        speed([0..0]kph, faster_than: dut.car, at: end )
        in_front_car.drive(path: path, adjust: false) with:
        lane(same_as: other_car)
        speed([0..0]kph)
        position([dxo_f+in_front_car.length ,ahead_of:other_car, at:end )
```


```
cut_out: parallel(duration: [1..4]second):
    dut.car.drive(path: path)
    other_car.drive(path: path, adjust: false) with:
        change_lane()
    in_front_car.drive(path: path, adjust: false) with:
        keep_lane()
    © 2020 Foretellix speed(speed: [0..0]kph)
```





Cut Out- Coverage and Measurements Definitions





!actual_Ve0 := sample(dut.car.state.speed,@lead.end) with:

cover(it,unit:kph,range:[0..60],every:10,text:"Actual velocity of ego at cut out start (can go up to 60kph by spec)")







Ex UNE Name	Overall Average Grade	Overall Covered	hicles
(no filter)	(no filter)	(no filter)	
A 🛛 ALKS	48.29%	191 / 1644 (11.62%)	The
🖌 🗖 1 Compliance basic	48.29%	191 / 1644 (11.62%)	
▲ 🗖 1.1 Scenarios	48.29%	191 / 1644 (11.62%)	
1.1.1 Cut In (App. 3 of ECE-TRANS-WP29-2020-081	.e) 54.23%	46 / 167 (27.54%)	
▲ 🗖 1.1.2 Cut out (App. 3 of ECE-TRANS-WP29-2020-08	31e) 🔲 51.71%	88 / 653 (13.48%)	
🖌 🗖 1.1.2.1 Initial state	62.87%	80 / 614 (13.03%)	
▶ 1.1.2.1.1 planned_Ve0	100%	6/6(100%)	
I.1.2.1.2 planned_Vo0	2 100%	6/6(100%)	driver)
I.1.2.1.3 planned_dxo_f	2 100%	10/10(100%)	The status r large and and an
I.1.2.1.4 actual_Ve0	66.67%	4 / 6 (66.67%)	The second s
I.1.2.1.5 actual_Vo0	16.67%	1/6(16.67%)	
▶	40%	4 / 10 (40%)	
I 1 2.2.7 actual_dx0_t	90%	9/10 (90%)	-
I.1.2.1.8 actual_dx0_plus_dx0_f	70%	7/10(70%)	
) 📼 1.1.2.1.9 actual_THW	40%	4/10(40%)	
I.1.2.1.10 actual_Ve0_actual_dx0_plus_dx	0_f 5.37%	29 / 540 (5.37%)	
1.1.2.2 Cut out state	40.56%	8 / 39 (20.51%)	No and the second
1.1.3 Deceleration (App. 3 of ECE-TRANS-WP29-20	20-C 38.92%	57 / 824 (6.92%)	
2 Advanced verification	n/a	0 / 0 (n/a)	
🔒 🗀 3 User defined	n/a	0 / 0 (n/a)	N NO 22 N

Non-RSS vs. RSS Controlled Ego

• In testing different EGOs, we have few examples where RSS controlled behavior is preventing a collision (keeping the ego out of "unpreventable" space)

No RSS




RSS Controlled Ego






THW COVERAGE/TESTING HOLE




Re-tuning EGO Parameters: THW issue solved




After

Regulatory Specs vs. Coverage Slice

The regulations includes "expected behaviors" for different ranges – coverage data shows that RSS controlled ego is within these "expected results" Coverage Samples





Summary: Measurable Safety – Coverage Metrics

- Usage of [Coverage] Metrics Supplies:
 - Goals for testing and certification
 - Threshold of quality and safe behaviors
 - Relative comparison between AVs
- Regulators seek Using standard templates, standard testing libraries and ODDs – in order to ensure you have a complete, <u>measurable</u>, certification system

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For More Information

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Safety Of The Intended Functionality (SOTIF)

"Absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards resulting from functional insufficiencies of the intended functionality or from reasonably foreseeable misuse by persons"

- SOTIF (ISO 21448) is dealing with Safety of Autonomous Systems, and provides guidance on design, verification, and validation measures
- SOTIF breaks down the possible scenario space to 4 categories
- "The ultimate goal is to evaluate the safety in area 2 and area 3 and to provide an argument that these areas are sufficiently small and the resulting residual risk is acceptable"


Known, hazardous scenarios (Area 2) Known, not hazardous scenarios (Area 1) Unknown, hazardous scenarios (Area 3) Unknown, not hazardous scenarios (Area 4)

2 1 3 4




foretify – The Full SOTIF Flow

- Foretify[™] is an automation and analysis tool, implementing the Coverage Driven Verification methodology
- Foretify[™] provides a systematic approach to reduce both area 2 and area 3
- Foretify[™] supports the SOTIF process, intended for reaching acceptable levels of risk







- How did the AV perform within a given ODD?
- KPI/Metrics specify the specific measurements to be analyzed, given specific test conditions /ODD. Usually – "simulation output"

• Answering:

- In ODD X, How did the ego perform for all test variations in the context of "cut in" ? (aggregate of all specific measurement)
- What was TTC, when the AV was driving at 55kph, and the other player deceleration was -3 m/s²? Is it above my threshold ?

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- What was actually tested, out of the possible space of testing values [per ODD]
- Coverage can be measured both on test input/settings ,as well on output/results of the tests. It can be measure on one ,two, or multiple dimensions

• Answering:

- For "cut in" scenario, on a road with 2 lanes and only green cars, what % of the possible AV speeds between 50KPH and 100KPH did I test ?
- What % of the TTC space between 0 and 3S was demonstrated during all tests ?

